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THE PURPOSE OF THE 
GENDER BRIEFING SERIES
This brief is part of a Gender Briefing Series to support women’s meaningful participation 
and the integration of gender perspectives in peace processes that aim to end violent intra-
state conflict. 
The key target audience is women, gender equality 
advocates and others engaged in peace processes, 
who wish to influence negotiations with a view to: (a) 
addressing the particular experiences of women dur-
ing conflict, and (b) achieving lasting peace process 
outcomes that will improve women’s lives and the 
lives of those around them.  
Using a comparative approach, the briefs: 
 • Establish the importance of the issue from a 
gender equality perspective and the importance of 
women’s meaningful engagement for effectively 
addressing it.
 • Identify key issues with reference to the inclusion of 
women and their gender-related and gender-specif-
ic dimensions.
 • Suggest ways of influencing change in peace 
processes, including identifying possible entry 
points and overcoming tensions with competing 
strategies.
 • Highlight through examples how integrating gender 
perspectives in peace agreements not only benefits 
women, but also helps diversify perspectives and 
proposed solutions, thereby contributing more 
generally to progress in peace processes for all.   
 • Provide quantitative and qualitative data from 
peace agreements, using examples from across the 
world as evidence and inspiration for action. 
 • Offer analysis that provides for principled 
approaches to inclusion – grounded in international 
legal standards – with an indication of how these 
can be linked to pragmatic political arguments. 
Too often, formal peace negotiations approach women’s 
meaningful participation and gender equality as a 
secondary and apolitical concern to ‘stopping the war’. 
Arguments are often made that the need for political 
pragmatism to end the conflict must singularly prevail. 
Yet both concerns are inextricably linked to one anoth-
er for sustainable peace. The approach of these briefs 
supports engagement in peace processes rooted in 
the principle of gender equality, while recognizing that 
provisions designed to achieve equality in any context 
will be negotiated politically in practice. To influence 
change, women will need to influence a range of ac-
tors, including those who may not see gender equality 
as central. Women themselves will also have diverse 
political views and perspectives. The briefs therefore 
offer comparative analysis, examples and framing 
questions to support women and others to develop 
proposals suitable to their own context, rather than 
prescribing any one approach.
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INTRODUCTION
Peace processes often focus on how to share or split power between the political and 
military groups at the heart of the conflict, in order to accommodate the wider identity and 
political groups they represent.  Arrangements for sharing or splitting power can focus on 
political institutions, economic arrangements, military arrangements, or territory (or differ-
ent combinations of these).1 
When peace negotiations propose territorial power-
sharing, this restructuring of the state presents 
opportunities for inclusion, and conversely, some in-
clusion trade-offs, for women to reflect on. Discussions 
of territory, power, and autonomy in peace processes 
often focus on the opportunities which these arrange-
ments provide for the inclusion of ethnic, national or 
indigenous groups, and sometimes for political/mili-
tary movements which operate from a particular 
geographic area. Despite the risk of destabilizing post-
conflict democracies (Graham, Miller, and Strøm, 2017), 
these arrangements often emerge as the only realistic 
option after violent intra-state conflict. The frequency 
with which territorial divisions of power are agreed 
on in peace processes means that women involved in 
these processes are likely to engage with this form of 
power-sharing. 
This Brief presents the different forms of territorial 
power-sharing that arise in peace agreements, and 
the potential opportunities and risks for women’s 
inclusion that these can entail. It proposes critical 
questions that women could ask of peace processes 
if territorial power-sharing is likely to be negotiated, 
and highlights strategies and tactics that women and 
allies have used in conflict-affected contexts to navi-
gate inclusion issues.  
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PART I: OVERVIEW
What is territorial power-sharing? 
Territorial power-sharing can be understood as the sharing and delegation of the central 
government’s powers and responsibilities to geographical units. It can include restructuring 
from a centralised to a federal state, or moving decision-making power from a central govern-
ment to regional or local governments. It can also include delegation of forms of political, 
fiscal, or administrative self-governance to regional or local groups who make claims to govern 
a particular area of territory.
There are different forms of territorial power-sharing. 
Federalism, confederalism, autonomy, devolution, and 
decentralization all entail different approaches to 
territorial self-governance. In reality, states often use 
complex combinations of multi-level governance 
to share territorial power (Norris, 2008: 157-185). 
Key principles of federalism are self-rule (significant 
decision-making powers over areas of vital interest 
for groups) and shared rule (mechanisms for groups 
to participate in decision-making at the centre, often 
through a second chamber in the central legislature) 
(Elazar, 1987). 
Degrees of power-sharing vary across different 
cases, and can involve division of powers between 
governing bodies at different levels. For example, 
the central government may retain complete control 
over immigration policy, but devolve powers over 
healthcare and education to a regional government. 
This division of powers may pertain to just one part 
of a state, or across several territorial entities, depend-
ing on the context. In states where multiple entities 
have devolved powers, territorial power sharing can 
be symmetric or asymmetric – entities may have the 
same degree of control over issues, or varying degrees 
of decision-making power over the same policy areas. 
In deeply divided societies, the choice of terminology 
can be highly contested, as people can associate differ-
ent meanings and expectations to the same concept. 
For some, territorial autonomy offers self-governance 
and protection for minority groups; for others, it 
implies the fragmentation and break-up of the state. 
When territorial power sharing is negotiated, inter-
ested parties may need time to unpack and explore 
different terms and concepts.
Why is territorial power-sharing 
important in peace processes? 
Territorial power-sharing can function as a form of 
group accommodation in deeply divided societies. 
These are societies which are heavily fragmented 
along lines of group identity, such as (but not exclu-
sively) ethnic, national, religious, linguistic, or cultural 
markers. Territorial power-sharing is frequently sug-
gested as an option for post-conflict state design, for 
conflicts framed as being fought along such identity 
cleavages, when majority and minority groups are ter-
ritorially concentrated. 
Although predominant in identity conflicts, even in 
conflicts where questions of identity are less salient, 
there may also be non-state armed groups – located 
in particular regions or locales reaching for a form of 
state-rebel accommodation – turning to territorial 
power-sharing arrangements as a means of securing 
an end to conflict. Here, territorial power-sharing can 
aim to accommodate competing ideologies and inter-
ests as to the future nature of the state. 
Where territorial control and group identity are intrin-
sically linked, territorial power-sharing acknowledges 
that different groups have diverging ideas of how to 
govern, but are also located within, or contest own-
ership of, the same territory. Rather than seeking to 
remove this impasse by changing international borders, 
territorial power-sharing offers states and non-state 
actors a way of managing contested territory whilst 
maintaining the inviolable nature of the state; although 
the means of agreeing on and implementing territorial 
power-sharing can be fraught and prolonged.
gaining ground: women and territorial 
power-sharing in peace processes 3
Out of 1518 peace agreements from 1990 to 1 January 
2016, 14 per cent contain provisions for territorial 
power-sharing.2 These include provisions to establish 
or modify:
 • Federal or similar systems of multi-level 
governance;
 • Local/municipal governments;
 • Autonomous regions; and
 • Other modalities of granting special territorial 
status.
Although framework and comprehensive agreements 
more frequently provide for territorial power-sharing 
than other types of peace agreements (such as 
ceasefire or implementation pacts), references to ter-
ritorial self-governance can be found in all stages of 
peace processes. This means that those concerned 
with engendering territorial power-sharing must be 
prepared to engage with and intervene at all stages 
of the process, as issues of territory can be discussed 
throughout, particularly if there is a strong territorial 
element to the conflict. Pushing for more gendered 
considerations of territorial power-sharing from an ear-
ly stage may help women, minorities, and their allies to 
negotiate more inclusive modalities of power-sharing 
at later agreement stages.3 
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PART II: A GENDER 
AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS 
ANALYSIS OF TERRITORIAL 
POWER-SHARING IN PEACE 
AGREEMENTS
Provision for territorial power-sharing in peace agreements ranges from weak, rhetorical 
affirmations, to a new geographic configuration of power, to detailed and comprehensive re-
structuring of the state at multiple levels of governance. Whilst not all territorial power- shar-
ing in peace processes results in an overhaul of state institutions and territorial boundaries, 
any form of devolution can affect women living within regional jurisdictions. It is important 
therefore for women, as citizens, to consider how proposals may affect the way their lives are 
governed in a post-conflict state, as they may be able to organize strategically to influence 
peace negotiations and the configuration of new arrangements (Tripp, 2018). 
New divisions of power within a state change the 
state’s self-definition and its narrative of inclusion both 
at the centre and at the regional level in important 
ways. There are several key reasons why women might 
be concerned with how territorial power-sharing is 
negotiated and agreed, all of which present potential 
opportunities and disadvantages.
For instance, there is potential for women to seek 
what is sometimes termed ‘federal advantage’ – that 
is, where women can manipulate political opportu-
nity structures presented by territorial power-sharing 
(under certain conditions) to advance their interests, 
which otherwise might not be possible in a unitary 
state (Vickers, 2011). Research on federalism and de-
volution in states such as Canada, Australia, Germany, 
the U.S, and the U.K, has questioned whether federal 
states provide more space for women’s representa-
tion or organization (see Vickers and Chappell (eds.), 
2011; Vickers, Chappell, and Meier (eds.), 2013. At the 
same time, other research on female representation 
in national legislatures in federations and in central-
ized states argues that federations can ‘facilitate the 
adoption of gender quotas’ and ‘allow women to enter 
parliament earlier than unitary states’ (Stockemer and 
Tremblay, 2015). This potential federal advantage, how-
ever, depends on several factors that women should 
consider and mobilize around (discussed below). These 
factors also raise possible negative consequences of 
territorial power-sharing, which women involved in 
peace processes need to be aware of.
Participation and representation
Quotas and reserved seats
Creating or restructuring institutions at multiple levels 
of governance may present women with opportuni-
ties to increase their ‘descriptive representation’ 
– that is, formal provision for women’s inclusion 
through institutional design that pushes for women 
to participate meaningfully. A critical factor here is 
the use of legally-binding quotas or reserved seats 
in peace agreements that agree to form or reform 
regional, provincial, municipal and local legislatures, 
executives and judiciaries, including second chambers 
created at the national level when adopting a fed-
eral system. This opportunity can be enhanced if new 
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regional institutions include quotas or other mecha-
nisms for effective participation of women. If quotas 
are non-existent in national institutions, women can 
put pressure on national-level institutions and central 
governments to adopt quota systems, or other forms 
of representation. Feminist activism in Spain suggests 
that women can use quotas at regional levels as an 
access point to challenge resistance to quotas at the 
national level, by ‘going level-shopping’ – targeting 
activism at different forums across various levels of 
governance -  until state-wide quotas can be passed as 
part of national equality legislation. Activists targeted 
regional political parties and cabinets to include a 
system that alternated men and women candidates in 
party lists (known as ‘zipping’) as part of their regional 
electoral laws, even when the central government in 
Spain opposed adopting gender quotas. (Alonso and 
Verge, 2014). However, regional quotas for women in 
quasi-federal states are quite rare, and level-shopping 
may not be an option for women in other contexts. 
There is evidence of regional reserved seats for wom-
en in several peace agreements to date:4
 • In Bangladesh, the 1997 agreement with the 
National Committee on Chittagong Hill Tracts 
agreed 3 reserved seats for women (both tribal and 
non-tribal) in each of the Hill District Councils and 
12 seats for tribal women (and 1 for non-tribal) in 
the Chittagong Hills Tracts Regional Council. 
 • The 2003 Memorandum of Settlement on Bodoland 
Territorial Council in India requires at least two 
nominated members of the council to be women. 
Similarly, the composition of the Bangsamoro 
council of leaders includes a representative of 
women, as proposed in the Philippines by the 2013 
Annex on Power-Sharing.
 • The 2015 Constitution of Nepal contains the most 
detailed quota provisions for women in provincial 
and local legislatures, which includes provisions for 
addressing potential barriers to electing women 
from political parties.
Within peace agreements without quotas, there are 
some provisions which commit to ‘promote’, ‘guar-
antee’ or ‘highly recommend’ the participation of 
women in sub-national institutions, or as repre-
sentatives of territorially-concentrated groups in 
national institutions. These include Territorial Planning 
Councils (Colombia), local and regional institutions 
(Guatemala), autonomous government (Bougainville), 
and as representatives of a territorially-concentrated 
group in the National Assembly (Sudan). Although all 
of these provisions do acknowledge the importance of 
women being adequately represented at all levels of 
the state, commitments are more liable to dismissal 
during implementation of the agreements, as they are 
not as detailed or concrete. This raises questions of 
enforcement during implementation phases of peace 
processes, and how women can most effectively 
organize to ensure that commitments to meaningful 
participation are upheld. Security is also an important 
consideration – although peace agreements may pro-
vide for quotas or reserved seats for women, without 
adequate security measures in place for women legis-
lators, they might be unable to participate in regional 
institutions, leaving participation mechanisms sym-
bolic but ineffective. 
Another issue to be aware of regarding quotas and 
reserved seats is that, like other forms of inclusive 
provisions, they can simply disappear from peace 
process agendas. Once off the table, it can be difficult 
for activists to regain momentum. In Yemen, the 2014 
National Dialogue Conference (NDC) provided a quota 
for at least 30 per cent representation of women in 
the proposed transitional justice commission, which 
would be split 50/50 between women from the South 
and the North. Subsequent events in the peace pro-
cess and conflict, however, led to the abandonment of 
the NDC proposals, and although Yemeni women ac-
tivists and their allies are currently struggling to push 
for representation in the peace talks, quotas have not 
appeared in any agreement signed since.
Nepal, Constitution of Nepal, 20 
September 2015, Part 14: Provincial 
Legislature, 176. Formation of the 
Provincial Assembly: (9). 
Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere 
in this Article, at least one third of the total num-
ber of members to be elected from each political 
party to the Provincial Assembly shall have to be 
women. In case at least one third of the candi-
dates elected from a political party pursuant to 
section (a) of clause (1) are not women, the politi-
cal party shall have to make provision of electing 
at least one third women while electing mem-
bers pursuant to section (b) of the same clause.
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Electoral system
Another important aspect for women in the insti-
tutional design of regional institutions proposed in 
peace agreements is the type of electoral system to 
be instituted. If women in a given context have prefer-
ences for one type of electoral system over the other 
for regional governments, it is important to try to em-
bed this in the peace agreement commitments, or in 
a subsequent law.  Some peace agreements contain 
provision regarding the electoral system, showing how 
it is sometimes negotiated as part of the peace pro-
cess, although, detail is often reserved for subsequent 
election laws, or refers to existing laws. For example, 
the 2005 Memorandum of Settlement in India simply 
stipulates that elections to the Darjeeling Gorkha Hills 
Council and to Panchayat bodies in the DGHC area 
be in accordance with the relevant provisions of the 
Indian constitution and existing laws of the central 
and federal state governments.
There is a predominant consensus among academics 
and practitioners that women achieve better descrip-
tive representation in central legislatures that use 
proportional representation electoral systems, rather 
than majority or plurality systems. In federal states, 
there is evidence to suggest that using proportional 
electoral systems is a positive factor for increased 
representation by women, but that the choice of an 
open or closed list system may affect the number of 
women elected in regional elections (Jones and Navia, 
1999), depending on the context. Women may need to 
assess the likely support they will receive from parties 
and voters, such as possible gender bias against female 
candidates on open lists, or decision-making within 
political parties that rank female candidates in worse 
positions on closed lists (see further, Allik, 2015). 
Commitments to using proportional representation 
at the central and regional levels appear in several 
of the Nepali peace agreements. However, the 2015 
Constitution of Nepal goes further than most by 
agreeing that the representation of women (and other 
minorities) will be elected to the Provincial Assembly 
(and the central House of Representatives) using a 
closed list proportional representation system, in ac-
cordance with federal law (Part 14, 166.1). In Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the 1994 Declaration on the Constitution 
of the Federation provided that legislators at the can-
ton level would be elected via an open list proportional 
representation electoral system, although it makes no 
specific references to a candidate’s gender.5 
The following provision for Yemen is an example of 
an agreement which provides for women’s participa-
tion through proportional representation and using 
closed lists:
The majority of peace agreement provisions for non-
central elections provide for free and fair elections to 
be held for all or some local government bodies, but 
do not offer further detail beyond that commitment. 
Peace agreements in 1995 for the internationally-
administered Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western 
Sirmium area of Croatia and agreements which 
commit to the timing of elections in regions, gover-
norates and municipalities in Iraq, are good examples 
of this basic commitment. The lack of detail in these 
agreements suggests that there is space for feminist 
interventions in peace processes regarding choice 
of electoral system. If no such opportunity becomes 
evident, however, efforts may be better directed to 
processes that draft electoral legislation, rather than 
peace agreements.
Questions regarding participation and 
representation that women can ask of the 
peace process
 • Is territorial sub-division being discussed, both within 
and outside of the formal process? Do women from 
different ethnic or national communities have differ-
ent views on territorial power-sharing proposals? 
Yemen, National Dialogue Outcomes 
Document, 25 January 2014, Chapter two, 
Section one, Working Group on State 
Building and Constitution-Principles and 
Foundations, Sixth. 
Decisions Relevant to the Electoral System:
1. The electoral system is (the closed  
proportional list) system.
2.  Political constituencies shall adhere by 
arranging their electoral lists to ensure 
access for at least 30% of women to the 
elected councils. The order of male and 
female candidates in the list shall be as 
follows: At least one woman for every 
thirty male candidates. Lists by political 
constituencies shall not be accepted if they 
are in contravention of the law. 
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 • In what ways is territorial sub-division likely to 
affect women’s rights at the regional or local levels, 
and the central or federal level? Will differently-lo-
cated women be affected in distinctive ways?
 • Have previous agreements provided for gender 
quotas or reserved seats in regional or local institu-
tions? If so, why was this lost from the agenda?
 • Are there existing gender quotas at the central 
level? Can these be used as a precedent to push for 
gender quotas in regional or local institutions?
 • Does the peace agreement draft include details 
of the proposed electoral system? If it suggests 
proportional representation, is this via open or 
closed lists? 
Human Rights and Equality
Territorial power-sharing is often advocated as a way 
of guaranteeing minority rights to self-governance, 
through devolution of powers over certain issues of 
particular concern to territorially-concentrated ethnic 
or indigenous minorities (often framed using rights-
based language). This does not, however, necessarily 
result in complete protection of women’s basic rights. 
In fact, devolution of powers to regional or local en-
tities can sometimes create or entrench barriers to 
women’s rights. 
Powers shared between the centre and regional or 
local entities can include executive, legislative, and or 
administrative capacities. In peace agreements, these 
are sometimes provided in detailed lists, which include 
development, health, education, social welfare, cul-
tural affairs (including language and religious practice), 
or are discussed in regards to the process of devolving 
powers, without specifying which powers. 
For women in peace processes this raises several 
issues. Multi-level systems can provide opportunities 
for women to ‘level-shop’ or ‘forum-shop’ in areas of 
human rights promotion, but they can also result in a 
‘territorial lottery’, whereby women in certain areas 
have worse access to services and funding as a result 
of asymmetric policies. Related to this is the existence 
of legal pluralism – the co-existence or overlapping 
of different legal orders -, which is also important for 
women to consider as it may create obstacles to wom-
en’s rights and access to justice (UN Women, 2011). 
Violence against women and reproductive 
rights
Struggles for reproductive rights and gender-based 
violence prevention offer examples of such oppor-
tunities and restrictions. In the United Kingdom, 
abortion law is a devolved matter. This has restricted 
the right of women in Northern Ireland to access free, 
safe and legal abortions, unlike in Wales and Scotland. 
Activists have attempted to circumvent the arrange-
ment by campaigning to use devolved powers over 
health in Scotland to provide free abortions to women 
who travel from Northern Ireland. Activists have also 
brought challenges to the United Kingdom Supreme 
Court around the devolved nature of abortion law, 
with some limited success. Despite a recent decision 
that the National Health Service will provide free 
abortions for women who travel to England, women 
in Northern Ireland still have asymmetric reproduc-
tive rights under a decentralized system (Thomson, 
2017). In Australia, activists have used the opportunity 
of multi-level governance to push for more gendered 
responses to violence against women, by utilizing 
state authority over civil and criminal law, even when 
a conservative Commonwealth federal government 
has been less proactive on the issue (Chappell & 
Costello, 2011).
Reproductive rights are only mentioned in seven out 
of 1518 peace agreements since 1990, and most either 
restrict a woman’s autonomy over her reproductive 
rights, or are designed to promote maternity and 
motherhood. The following peace agreement con-
stitution for Somalia restricts access to abortion in a 
rights framework that applies across all units of the 
federal state:
Provisional Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Somalia, 1st August 2012, 
Title Two: Rights, Basic Personal Liberties 
and Limitations, Article 15. Liberty and 
Security of the Person (5). 
Abortion is contrary to Shari’ah and is prohibited 
except in cases of necessity, especially to save 
the life of the mother.
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Additionally, references in peace agreements to 
reproduction are mainly included as basic or funda-
mental rights to maternity and child care across all 
levels of the state, although responsibility for moth-
erhood is sometimes listed as a joint power between 
central and regional governments. In Chechnya, the 
1996 Draft Treaty provides that the ‘coordination 
of health-care issues; the protection of the family, 
motherhood, fatherhood, and childhood’ all come 
under the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation 
and the Chechen Republic (Article 6, 7.). 
The most explicit commitment to reproductive rights 
at central and regional levels is in the following agree-
ment for Mexico:
Legal pluralism
The territorial lottery can be made harder in peace 
agreements that provide for customary or tradi-
tional law in regional or local entities, in cases of 
legal pluralism that restrict women’s rights. There are 
several examples in peace agreements where special 
jurisdiction for non-central levels involves the use of 
customary law as a mechanism to protect minority 
self-governance, particularly for indigenous peoples. 
The 1991 Constitution of Colombia provided for in-
digenous peoples to exercise governance functions 
within particular territorial areas in accordance with 
their own laws and functions, although this power 
was limited, as these functions could not be contrary 
to the Constitution and the laws of the Republic 
(Article 248). Customary courts were proposed for the 
Bodoland Autonomous Council area in India in 1993, 
and the 2001 Bougainville Peace Agreement in Papua 
New Guinea agrees to establish a commission to ex-
amine giving the autonomous government powers to 
integrate customary law.
Women’s rights advocates have questioned the 
exclusive jurisdiction of Shari’a law in some regions. 
They claim that this not only institutionalizes differ-
ences in women’s rights between regional or local 
entities, but also between women under different 
legal systems within these entities, all while not ap-
plying to all citizens within a territory regardless of 
their faith. 
For example: 
In Aceh, Indonesia, women activists have struggled 
with implementation of commitments to self-gov-
ernment granted by the 2005 Helsinki Memorandum 
of Understanding, particularly when, in 2009, the 
provincial parliament passed an Islamic Criminal 
Code that included corporal punishment for adultery, 
criminalized homosexuality, and strict morality codes 
regulating women’s bodies and behaviour. Although 
Shari’a law was not new to Aceh, further decentral-
ization in the country emboldened the conservative 
provincial parliament to push through further reforms 
to the legal system (Afrianty, 2015).
In the Philippines, the 2012 Framework Agreement 
on the Bangsamoro grants the Bangsamoro regional 
government competence over the Shari’a justice sys-
tem, with the supremacy of Shari’a and its application 
only to Muslims in the region. The National Network 
for Muslim Women’s Rights have argued that the 
application of Shari’a only to Muslims within the re-
gion is being used to justify Muslim women’s lack of 
autonomy and inequality within Mindanao (Solamo-
Antonio, 2005). 
The extent of self-rule in both cases makes it difficult 
for women to utilize opportunities for justice and 
equality at other levels of government, particularly as 
territorial power-sharing was agreed as a way to end 
violent insurgencies against the state, and protecting 
women’s rights was not a priority. 
Mexico, Actions and Measures for 
Chiapas Joint Commitments and 
Proposals from the State and Federal 
Governments, and the EZLN, 16 February 
1996, Situation, Rights and Culture of 
Indigenous Women, Paragraph 8. 
Compliance with the international pacts and 
conventions which have been entered into by 
the Mexican government. Of particular impor-
tance here, is Convention 169 of the ILO, the 
Vienna Declaration on Human Rights referring 
to the elimination of any form of discrimination 
against women, and the Agreement of the World 
Conference on Population and Development re-
ferring to the health and reproductive rights of 
women as long as these do not contravene the 
basic principles of the General Constitution of 
the Republic. 
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In some cases, where territorial power-sharing has 
infringed, rather than protected, women’s rights, 
activists have used international human rights law 
and frameworks to challenge restrictive regional or 
local governments. Activists in Northern Ireland have 
used the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) to request 
an inquiry into abortion law in Northern Ireland, with 
the request still outstanding. Here, local activists tar-
geted international law that the central government 
has ratified, again using multiple levels of territorial 
power-sharing to reform the regional level, although 
this strategy still requires support from both national 
and international mainstream human rights advocates 
(O’Rourke, 2016).
Regional constitutions could be a way to navigate 
this, and may be useful to consider, although 
how effective in practice depends on the local le-
gal culture. Such constitutions, for example, could 
provide bills of rights which regional executives and 
legislatures must adhere to, or incorporate inter-
national human rights law (which occurs in several 
peace agreements) – although the wider constraints 
of using international law to affect domestic change 
would still apply. An example of the latter is the 1994 
Washington Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
which incorporated the 1979 International Convention 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
and the 1957 Convention on the Nationality of Married 
Women into the Federation Constitution, adopted on 
June 24th 1994. Another example is the Sudan/Darfur 
Peace Agreement, which although not a regional 
constitution, provides the following guarantees at all 
levels of the state: 
It is important to note that ratifying international 
human rights law at regional or local levels does not 
guarantee that regional governments will implement 
or respect these standards. Still, they may offer a plat-
form for women activists to frame and raise challenges 
against discrimination and violation of women’s rights 
in these regional entities (see Gender Briefing Series: 
Women, Constitution-making and Peace Processes).
Questions regarding human rights and 
equality that women can ask of the peace 
process
 • Does a proposed regional government have 
absolute rights guarantees pertaining to human 
rights, reproductive rights, and rights to equality 
and non-discrimination? 
 • Is there an accessible dispute mechanism that 
could be used to mount challenges against viola-
tions of women’s rights within regional or local 
entities?
 • Could legal pluralism create barriers to women’s 
rights at regional or local levels? 
 • Are there proposed mechanisms for regional 
governments to ratify and implement international 
legal frameworks for women’s rights and equality 
(e.g. CEDAW)? 
Identity
The emphasis on group identity – be it ethnic, national, 
or indigenous – in the adoption of territorial power-
sharing in peace agreements, raises several important 
considerations for women. Ethnic and/or national 
identities can be framed in highly gendered terms, 
which convey particular expectations of women’s 
roles in nation-building projects and ethnic conflict. 
This mean that any governance arrangements which 
prioritize ethnic and/or national identities should be 
viewed through a gendered lens.  
Women as members of local minorities
Firstly, women from various identity groups may 
experience territorial power-sharing differently, par-
ticularly if they are members of a minority group in 
regional or local entities (sometimes referred to as 
‘local’ minorities).6 This can be the case in regional 
nation-building projects, which may promote progres-
sive gender politics even when the central government 
does not, such as for example, in the engender-
ing amendments to the Iraqi Criminal Code by the 
Kurdish Regional Government (Joly & Bakawan, 2016). 
Importantly, however, the differing socio-economic 
status of women in Iraqi-Kurdistan still means dis-
crepancies between who actually benefits from these 
reforms, and who does not. In the case of Canada, 
nation-building projects which promoted progressive 
gender politics in the 1970s as a way to gain support, 
Sudan/ Darfur, Darfur Peace Agreement, 
5 May 2006, Article 3: Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, 28. (a). 
Women and men shall enjoy all civil and 
political rights enshrined in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well 
as all economic, social and cultural rights in the 
International Covenant ratified by the GoS.
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benefited Pan-Canadian and Quebec feminist move-
ments at both the federal and Quebec state levels. 
However, “Aboriginal women active in the ‘First 
Nations’ nationalist projects were not advantaged 
and continued to experience negative outcomes from 
the federal government’s neo-colonial laws”. (Vickers, 
2011).
Territorial power-sharing provisions are often drafted 
with majorities and minorities that have mobilized 
around claims of territorial self-governance in mind 
(see Csergő, Roseberry and Wolff, 2017). These are 
identity groups that are party to the conflict. It is 
therefore unsurprising that peace agreements scarcely 
provide for local minority women. Still, there are a few 
examples where territorial power-sharing arrange-
ments include specific protections for local minority 
women in regional entities, and which go beyond basic 
equality provisions. 
An unimplemented agreement relating to the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh demonstrates 
the most substantive provision intended to include 
non-tribal women in a non-central institution (defined 
as “non-tribal permanent residents”: a person who 
is non-tribal but has legal land in the hill district and 
generally lives in the hill district at a specific address):
However, reserving a small number of seats for women 
risks making it harder for them to push for representa-
tion beyond their prescribed allocation (see Gender 
Briefing Series: Women and Political Power-sharing). 
Other peace agreement provisions for local minorities 
in federal, regional or local entities include: 
 • A commitment by the federal government of 
Assam and the Bodoland Autonomous Council 
(BAC) to protect “all rights and interests of the 
non-tribals as on date living in the BAC area”; 
 • Reserved seats for “Others” (those who do not 
identify as one of the three constituent peoples) on 
the Mostar City Council in the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina;
 • Reserved seats for non-tribal representation on the 
Executive Council on the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill 
Council; and
 • A commitment to adequate representation of 
non-Moro indigenous communities, women, 
settler communities, and other sectors within the 
Bangsamoro assembly and council of leaders.7 
While these agreements do not specifically provide 
for local minority women, they do suggest oppor-
tunities where (if the institutions are formed with 
measures for upholding women’s security) minor-
ity women could organize to push for representation 
within regional or local governments. It is crucial 
to note however, as the example of the “Others” in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina demonstrates, that commit-
ments to local minorities can move on and off peace 
process agendas, and that such mechanisms may not 
become institutionalized if they are not present in the 
‘final’ comprehensive agreement of constitution.  
Political power-sharing at regional levels
Second, there are potential opportunities for 
women to use ethnic or national identities at the 
regional level, in arrangements where political 
power-sharing is expressed through regional in-
stitutions. Women can organize around several 
strategies when peace agreements provide for political 
power-sharing, and apply these when power-sharing 
mechanisms are then used at the regional level (for 
more detail see Gender Briefing Series: Women and 
Political Power-sharing). Strategies include:
 • Building in quotas for local minority women as part 
of proportionality provisions; 
 • Forming coalitions with other marginalized groups 
discriminated against on grounds such as sexual 
orientation or race, to mobilize around issues of 
equality and assert claims for representation in 
regional institutions (Bell, 2018);
 • Coordinating and organizing with women from dif-
ferent ethnic or national groups (e.g. the Northern 
Ireland Women’s Coalition) to push for inclusion 
Bangladesh/ Chittagong Hill Tracts, 
Agreement between the National 
Committee on Chittagong Hill Tracts 
Constituted by the Government and 
The Parbattya Chattagram Janasanghati 
Samity, 2 December 1997, B) (Kha) 
Chittagong Hill Tracts Local Government 
Council/ Hill District Council, a). 
There shall be 3 (three) seats for women in each 
of the Hill District Councils. One third (1/3) of 
these seats shall be for non-tribals. 
gaining ground: women and territorial 
power-sharing in peace processes 11
in the peace process, and subsequent regional 
institutions; and
 • Pushing for liberal models of power-sharing that 
use open definitions of group identities, rather than 
corporate models that rely on strict definitions (Bell 
et.al, 2017).
Questions regarding identity that women 
can ask of the peace process
 • How do the proposed power-sharing arrangements 
use definitions of group identity? Are these defini-
tions rigid or fixed and tied to identities which 
are not viewed as a matter of choice, or are they 
expressed in more open ways that could help group 
identity be re-shaped and re-interpreted over time?
 • If definitions are open, can women use this to 
promote proportional representation that includes 
women from various backgrounds? 
 • If definitions are fixed, can women organize across 
communities to nominate women within propor-
tional allocations for different identity groups in 
regional or local institutions? 
 • Do territorial power-sharing provisions explicitly 
reference local minorities? Do they reference 
women from these minorities? If not, can women 
organize to nominate local minority women in the 
allocations for minorities in regional institutions?
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PART III: STRATEGIES 
FOR CHANGE
Dealing with technical detail 
Territorial power-sharing and its design can be easy to understand within broad terms. 
Splitting territory and creating new regional or local institutions is visible and can appear 
quite dramatic. For women and gender advocates, however, the real implications for the 
treatment of women at each level will depend on complicated technical detail, often requir-
ing specialist assistance to untangle to fully understand the impact on women.  
The following list of technical details indicates some of 
the complexity involved:
 • How are peace agreement pre-ambles written, and 
how can the concept of gender equality be part of 
the framing of any new conception of statehood? 
 • How and what quotas might usefully be pushed for 
when the peace process discusses new political in-
stitutions? How should they be set up legally to be 
effective? What expertise do women have at hand 
to test scenarios and understand how different 
proposals might affect women’s representation?
 • Where and how will territorial boundaries be 
drawn and re-drawn?
 • How will decisions be made about which powers 
will be left with the central government and which 
powers will be devolved to regional governments, 
and how will this affect women’s rights?
 • What will be the basis for asserting women’s and 
human rights at each level?
 • How will re-drawing territorial boundaries create 
new minorities and majorities, and what are the 
implications for newly local minority women?
One strategy is to identify women with an inter-
est and aptitude for technical detail, who are also 
capable of taking forward concerns and proposals 
from among communities, and using these to craft 
suggestions for the technical details. Decisions over 
the technical detail can become protracted, and once 
agreement on territorial power-sharing is agreed more 
broadly, it can be moved from the main political and 
military actors in the peace process to technical work-
ing groups (such as in the Mindanao peace process), 
where it might be more effective to push for women’s 
inclusion, or to submit proposals. 
Dealing with differently placed 
women
Formulating a cohesive response among women to 
territorial power-sharing in a conflict-affected society 
is a difficult process. A woman from a territorially-con-
centrated and mobilized minority might experience 
devolution of power to local institutions as a form of 
liberation from a disinterested or repressive central 
government. Conversely, a woman in the same region 
who identifies as a member of a majority group at the 
central level may fear further withdrawal of the state 
and the adjustment to being a newly local minority. 
For one woman, the central government retaining a 
role in monitoring the country’s human right’s com-
mitments may seem like an important gain, while for 
another it may feel like a subtle way to minimize the 
extent of devolved powers and territorial gains won 
through conflict.   
These concerns obviously go beyond women, and 
many women have organized across communal di-
vides before, during, and after conflict on a variety 
of issues (see Cockburn, 2007), without requiring 
that women play a collaborative role for the sake of 
cohesion, and recognizing that women from different 
nation-building projects may not wish to co-operate. 
Ultimately, creating spaces for dialogue which aim 
to build trust, and to discuss why different women 
might have different understandings of territorial 
power-sharing, are a critical way to facilitate further 
organizing and build cohesion. 
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CONCLUSION
Territorial power-sharing may present women with a variety of opportunities to push for 
greater inclusion within post-conflict institutions. Conversely, it can also pose risks to women’s 
fundamental rights and protections. 
The important thing for women to consider in peace 
processes is that territorial power-sharing arrange-
ments are not fixed, and do not function in a vacuum. 
As with other mechanisms for accommodating minor-
ity groups, the nuances of territorial power-sharing 
arrangements are tied into political processes across all 
levels of governance. The possibilities for engendering 
territorial power-sharing greatly depend on various 
contextual factors which women in conflict-affected 
states are intimately aware of. Still, there are valuable 
lessons from other peace processes and territorially-
divided states which may help women avoid the 
pitfalls of power-sharing when it is being negotiated.
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Bangladesh/ Chittagong Hill Tracts, Agreement between the 
National Committee on Chittagong Hill Tracts Constituted 
by the Government and The Parbattya Chattagram 
Janasanghati Samity, 2 December 1997. https://www.
peaceagreements.org/view/238/
Bosnia/Yugoslavia (former), Dayton Agreement on 
Implementing the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Dayton, 10 November 1995. https://www.peace 
agreements.org/view/2/
Bosnia/ Yugoslavia (former), Framework Agreement for the 
Federation (Washington Agreement or Contact Group 
Plan), 1 March 1994. https://www.peaceagreements.org/
view/608/
Bosnia/ Yugoslavia (former), Declaration Concerning the 
Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(with Proposed Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina attached), 18 March 1994. https://www.
peaceagreements.org/view/1198/
Colombia, Participacíon política: Apertura democrática para 
construir la paz, 6 November 2013. https://www.peace 
agreements.org/wview/812/
Colombia, Political Constitution of Colombia, 1 July 1991 
https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/163/
Croatia, Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, 
Baranja, and Western Sirmium (‘The Erdut Agreement’), 
12 November 1995. https://www.peaceagreements.org/
view/563/
Guatemala, Agreement on the Social and Economic Aspects 
and Agrarian Situation, 6 May 1996. https://www.peace 
agreements.org/wview/291/
India/ Bodoland, Memorandum of Settlement (‘Bodo Accord’), 
20 February 1993.  https://www.peaceagreements.org/
view/30/
India/ Bodoland, Memorandum of Settlement on Bodoland 
Territorial Council, 10 February 2003. https://www.
peaceagreements.org/view/652/
India/ Darjeeling, Memorandum of Settlement, 6 December 
2005.  https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/1717/
Indonesia/ Aceh, Memorandum of Understanding between 
the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free 
Aceh Movement (Helsinki MOU), 15 August 2005.  https://
www.peaceagreements.org/view/450/
Iraq, Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the 
Transitional Period, 8 March 2004. https://www.peace 
agreements.org/view/1422/
Mexico, Actions and Measures for Chiapas Joint Commitments 
and Proposals from the State and Federal Governments, 
and the EZLN, 16 February 1996. https://www.peace 
agreements.org/view/214/
Nepal, Constitution of Nepal, 20 September 2015. https://
www.peaceagreements.org/view/1361/
Papua New Guinea/ Bougainville, Bougainville Peace 
Agreement, 30 August 2001. https://www.peace 
agreements.org/view/312/
Philippines/ Mindanao, Joint Technical Working Group 
Meeting on Territory, 6 February 2006. https://www.
peaceagreements.org/view/991/ 
Philippines/ Mindanao, Framework Agreement on the 
Bangsamoro, 15 October 2012.  https://www.peace 
agreements.org/view/867/
Philippines/ Mindanao, Annex on Power-Sharing to the 
Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB), 8 
December 2013. https://www.peaceagreements.org/
view/868/
Russia/ Chechnya, Draft Treaty on the Delimitation of 
Subjects of Jurisdiction and Powers between the Russian 
Federation Organs of State Power and the Chechen 
Republic Organs of State Power, 31 May 1996. https://
www.peaceagreements.org/view/371/
Somalia, Provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Somalia, 1 August 2012. https://www.peaceagreements.
org/view/1360/
Sudan/ Darfur, Darfur Peace Agreement, 5 May 2006. 
https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/350/
Sudan/ Eastern Sudan, Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement, 19 
June 2006. https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/373/
Yemen, National Dialogue Outcomes Document, 25 January 
2014. https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/1400/
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APPENDIX B: RESOURCES
International Civil Society Action Network – ICAN, 2018. ICAN’s 
Gendered Devolution Video. [video]. Available at: https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=LAIzDwgDkbY&feature=you
tu.be [Accessed February 20, 2018].
International Development Research Centre. 2008. Policy 
Recommendations on Decentralization, Local Power and 
Women’s Rights. Ottawa: IDRC. Available at: https://www.
idrc.ca/en/article/policy-recommendations- 
decentralization-local-power-and-womens-rights. 
Language of Peace, University of Cambridge: www. 
languageofpeace.org.
PA-X Peace Agreements Database, University of Edinburgh: 
www.peaceagreements.org. 
PA-X Gender Peace Agreements Database, University of 
Edinburgh: www.peaceagreements.org/wsearch.
Peacemaker, United Nations: www.peacemaker.un.org.
Peace Accords Matrix, University of Notre Dame: www.
peaceaccords.nd.edu.  
Töpperwien, N., 2009. Federalism and Peace Mediation. Zurich: 
swisspeace/CSS ETH-Zurich, and in consultation with the 
Mediation Support Unit, Department of Political Affairs, 
United Nations. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/
sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/FederalismMediation_
Swisspeace.pdf.
Töpperwien, N., 2010. Decentralization, Special Territorial 
Autonomy, and Peace Negotiations. Zurich: swisspeace/
CSS ETH-Zurich, and in consultation with the Mediation 
Support Unit, Department of Political Affairs, United 
Nations. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/
peacemaker.un.org/files/Peace_Mediation_Essentials_
Decentralization.pdf.
United Nations, 2017. Guidance on Gender and Inclusive 
Mediation Strategies. New York: UN Department of Political 
Affairs, pp. 34-36. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/
node/2940.
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